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Abstract 
Innovation is considered crucial for firms to compete effectively. The extant 
research on innovation has provided significant insights, but, however, the majority 
examined innovation in the context of technology. Only a few exceptions have 
explored how social and behavioral factors influence firms in the innovation 
processes. Based on the coevolution perspective, this study examines innovation 
process of a software firm participating in the ever-changing information security 
software industry. We focused on how the firm guided its offerings to coevolve with 
new technologies and relevant changes among different groups of human actors. 
Our data reveals that the firm developed different offerings in different periods to 
cope with the changing driving forces—technologies, users, and hackers—in each 
period. Effectively identifying the driving forces and guided its offerings to coevolve 
with them, the firm successfully sustained its competitive advantage in the period 
characterized with turbulence in the environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is doubtless that widely accepted that innovation plays a crucial role in a 
firm’s competitiveness (e.g. Hitt 1999; Ireland and Hitt 1999; Hamel 2000). 
Researchers in various disciplines such as organization, marketing, engineering 
and new product development have conducted numerous studies on the origin, 
forms, types, and processes of innovation, providing fruitful insights to advance our 
knowledge of innovation. However, far more attention has been paid to 
technologies than to human and social aspects, the factors yet to be fully tapped 
by innovation scholars (e.g. MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985; Williams and Edge 
1999).  
In this paper we aim to contribute to a better understanding of how 
technologies and human actors interact to drive the changes, and how a firm 
identifies the driving forces of changes and take managerial actions to coevolve 
with the changes. We conduct a single historical case study to examine the 
innovation process of a software firm in a turbulent high-tech industry characterized 
by frequent and rapid changes of technologies and relevant human actors. 
Evidence from our case study indicates that the firm effectively identified the 
driving forces in the environment and guided its offerings to coevolve with new 
technologies and relevant social changes. The firm successfully sustained its 
competitiveness via such a process of guided coevolution, and, in turn, created 
new market segments to re-shape industry.  
The current study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it 
provides insights to enrich the theory of innovation process by integrating and 
synthesizing technological aspects and human actors in the theory of innovation 
process. Second, this study contribute to the study of coevolution of organizations 
and their environments (Lewin and Volberda 1999). Third, this paper provides 
insights for high-tech companies to take consideration of both technologies and 
human actors in their innovation process.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The majority of innovation studies have been focusing on technology. For 
example, innovations are distinguished as incremental (continuous) or radical 
(discontinuous). An incremental innovation exploits existing technologies, improves 
current designs, and introduces minor changes to products or services. Radical or 
discontinuous innovation, in contrast, is based on technological breakthroughs and 
often create opportunities for new applications and new markets (Ettlie et al. 1984; 
Dewar and Dutton 1986; Tushman and Anderson 1986). This stream of research 
on technological innovation was further extended and refined to include notions 
such as “architecture innovation” (Henderson and Clark 1990), which is based on 
linkages between core concepts and components; and “disruptive innovation” 
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(Christensen 1997), which identified the possibility that technologies with inferior 
performance can displace established incumbents.  
The above innovation researches have produced important insights. However, 
focusing solely on technology also brought limitations. The influence of other 
factors has yet been fully explored, except for psychological variables such as 
‘perceived usefulness’ and ‘perceived ease of use’ in the innovativeness adoption 
model (Rogers 1995) or technology acceptance model (Davis 1986; Podolny and 
Stuart 1995; Venkatesh and Davis 2000).  Even these models take psychological 
factors into account, they consider technology the driving force of innovation, 
emphasizing how organizations can conduct internal activities to “adopt” or 
“accept” emerging technologies in their external environments.  
To augment the insufficiency of the above “technology-economic paradigm”, 
another stream of technological innovation research―the tradition of social 
shaping of technology (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985; Williams and Edge 1999) 
―endeavored to incorporate social factors in the process of technological 
advancements. This stream of studies has shed light on how social forces 
influence progress of technological innovation, but has paid little attention to an 
organization’s internal efforts on innovation and the possibility that a firm’s 
innovation can, in turn, shape the development of technology. Therefore, a holistic 
approach that takes technological, social, and managerial factors into 
consideration will help us to better understand how a firm can innovate to remain 
competitive in an environment with changing technologies.   
To examine the joint effects of technological, social, and managerial factors in 
the innovation process, we believe the coevolution perspective is appropriate 
because “the coevolution lens has the potential for integrating micro- and macro-
level evolution within a unifying framework, incorporating multiple levels of 
analyses and contingent effects, and “leading to new insights and new 
understanding” (Lewin and Volberda 1999). We follow Lewin and Volberda’s 
perspective that “change may occur in all interacting populations of organizations”, 
and use their definition of coevolution as “the joint outcome of managerial 
intentionality, environment, and institutional effects” (Lewin and Volberda 1999). 
Such a perspective is not suitable for the use of quantitative methodologies. Thus, 
we adopt the qualitative approach as our research methodology. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Several reasons explain why the qualitative approach is more adequate. First, 
when organizational processes such as innovation processes are involved, 
quantitative measurements are inappropriate (e.g. Van Maanen 1979; Strauss and 
Corbin 1990), as are survey-based methodologies (Yin, 1983). Second, the 
coevolutionary perspective, which incorporates multiple levels of analyses to 
investigate the joint outcome of managerial actions and environmental effects, calls 
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for a fine-grained process study (Lewin and Volberda 1999). Such a process study 
can only be explored thoroughly via qualitative approaches such as in-depth case 
studies (e.g. Yin 1983; Strauss and Corbin 1990). Therefore, in this paper, we use 
a single case study for the purpose of elaborating upon a set of intertwined 
multilevel relationships and concepts necessary for process theory development. 
The objective of the case analysis is to investigate the coevolution of relevant 
human actors with technologies, as well as how a firm identifies the driving force in 
the ecosystem and then purposefully guides its offerings to coevolve with them.  
We chose this particular industry context—the antivirus and information 
security software industry—for two reasons. First, the antivirus and information 
security software industry are characterized with turbulent changes, in both 
technologies and human actors, and in both industry macroevolution and firm 
microevolution as well. Technological and human actors, such as users and 
hackers, are inextricably intertwined, and thus provide an ideal setting for 
innovation process study in the coevolutionary perspective. Second, the case 
company, Trend Micro Inc., is highly recognized by industry analysts, such as IDC, 
for its innovativeness (Burke 2004). Examination of its innovation process will bring 
significant insights. The time frame of 1998 to 2005 was chosen because in this 
period, the antivirus and Internet security saw the biggest changes, compared to 
those in other periods.  
In the following section, we will first introduce the industry background by 
explaining how computer viruses have evolved and related how human actors, 
including users and hackers, have involved. Then we describe the stages of the 
coevolution process, elaborating how the case company purposefully guided its 
offerings to coevolve with three relevant populations: technologies, hackers, and 
users.  
 
4. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
4.1. Computer viruses and malware 
A computer virus is a program—usually a piece of executable code—that has 
the unique ability to replicate. Like biological viruses, computer viruses can spread 
quickly and are often difficult to eradicate. They attach themselves to just about 
any types of files and proliferate by residing in files that are copied and sent from 
individual to individual. In addition to replication, a number of computer viruses 
share another commonality: a damage routine that delivers the virus payload. 
While payloads may only display messages or images, they can also destroy files, 
reformat the hard drive, or cause other damage. If the virus does not contain a 
damage routine, it can cause problems by consuming storage space and memory, 
degrading the overall performance of the computer, or consuming precious 
network bandwidth, bringing tremendous troubles and interruptions to computer 
users both at home and in business operations.  
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Not every piece of code that interferes with the proper functioning of computers 
is a virus. In fact, the broader term generally used in the industry is “malware” 
(sometimes called malicious software or malicious code). Malware is a typology 
that includes not only viruses but also other code or software contaminants. 
Although a virus may be distinguished from other types of malicious code (for 
example, a worm or a Trojan horse), it remains the most generally understood and 
frequently used term to encompass all of these malicious programs. In this study 
we do not distinguish viruses from other types of malware. The main reason is that 
we intend to avoid unnecessary confusion, because the convergence of different 
types of malware has been observed and has kept blurring boundaries among 
them. We use the terms “viruses”, “malicious codes”, or “malware” interchangeably 
to represent all types of malicious programs that are detrimental to computer 
usage.  
4.2. Technologies, users, and hackers 
The virus-fueled multifaceted changes in threats that complicated the 
information security software industry were actually a joint outcome caused by 
continuous coevolution of technologies and human actors such as hackers and 
users. Changes only in technologies could hardly have led to such upheavals.  
Users play a crucial role in the information security industry. In this study, we 
refer to users as individuals, organizations, or other entities that employ the 
resources or services provided by a computer system. The needs of users shape 
technological development—and in turn, behaviors of users are affected by 
technologies. The word “hacker” was originally used in the computing community 
to describe a particularly brilliant programmer or technical expert. Today it 
generally describes computer intruders or criminals. Some people advocate terms 
such as "cracker" or "black-hat" to replace it; others prefer to retain the common 
popular usage, arguing that the original form is confusing and will never likely be 
pervasive. In this study, we follow the common popular usage of the term “hacker” 
to include different sorts of malicious computer professionals who sabotage 
computer security. These people include virus writers, intruders, crackers, vandals, 
etc. Hackers exploit new technologies to undertake hacking activities: their tools 
have been increasingly sophisticated as new technologies developed, and they 
always utilize the most advanced and prevalent technologies to create havoc. Their 
motives and intentions have also evolved over time.  
Analyzing the data obtained, we find that the driving forces of coevolution are 
different in different periods of time. Technologies, users, and hackers—the three 
highly intertwined populations in the ecosystem—take turns to drive the 
coevolution process. Each population exerts influences on the other two and shape 
their development. Our case company recognized the phenomenon, and 
purposefully guided its internal innovation activities to coevolve with the three 
elements. 
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5. CASE DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Our case company, Trend Micro Incorporated, produces antivirus and Internet 
content security software products and services. Its solutions protect the flow of 
information on PCs, file servers, email servers and at the Internet gateway, 
providing comprehensive and centrally controlled management for enterprise 
network security. Founded in 1988, the Tokyo-based corporation was the fourth 
largest secure content and threat management software company in the world in 
2007 (Burke et al 2007), employing more than 3700 people in 30 countries. Sales 
have soared by an average of nearly 75% per year over the past decade, reaching 
US$848 million in 2007. The company has been listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (4704) since 1998, and was chosen as a component of the Nikkei Stock 
Average on September 19, 2002. The 225-share Nikkei Stock Average is Japan’s 
most widely followed stock market index, composed of leading companies listed on 
the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  
Examining Trend Micro’s history of innovation, we found evidence that the 
company has been purposefully guiding its new offerings, including products and 
services, to coevolve with technologies, hackers, and users. In different periods of 
time, different populations drove the coevolution process. The company recognized 
signs of changes and seized opportunities to initiate innovations.   
5.1. Stage 1 (1988 – 1994) 
5.1.1. Technologies drove the coevolution in Stage 1 (1988 – 1994) 
Coevolution in this period of time was mainly driven by technologies. 
Technologies relevant to viruses include programming languages and platforms, 
and hackers have been continually exploiting advances in these technologies to 
compose viruses. Programming languages is a standardized communication 
technique for expressing instructions to a computer. It is the basis on which viruses 
and other malicious codes are composed—just like different toxicants are created 
based on different chemical elements. As time went by, new programming 
languages emerged, and thus provided new bases for hackers to create new types 
of viruses.  
Viruses first appeared on personal computers in the 1980s, when Microsoft 
DOS was the most prevalent platform of PCs. Platforms have always played a 
dominant role in the history of PCs, providing a basis on which different 
applications are built. Dominant platforms on PCs evolved from DOS to Window 
3.x and then to Windows 95 in this period of time; hackers consequently created 
new species of viruses to infect these different platforms.  
On the other hand, advances in technologies also changed users’ perceptions 
and behaviors. Traditionally, virus infection was perceived as a problem on 
personal computers, and it was the individual user’s responsibility to protect his or 
her own PC, either at home or in the office. Most users installed antivirus software 
on their own PCs to scan for viruses, and endeavored to remove viruses and 
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recover the computer by themselves whenever a virus was found. This practice did 
not change until the rise of local area networks (LANs).  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, LAN technologies were swiftly developed 
and grew to be ubiquitous. Novell NetWare dominated the LAN market with nearly 
70% of market share. Before LAN, users exchanged files by swapping floppy 
diskettes with each other. The prevalence of LAN enabled users to exchange 
information via the network. More and more people stored files on “servers,” 
computer systems that shared them with other computers upon users’ requests. 
Exchange of files among users thus became faster and easier. Gradually the 
servers became very important “storage rooms” and “file exchange centers” for 
most users.  
Development of LAN technologies changed users’ information-sharing 
behavior and facilitated information exchange. Unfortunately, it also created a new 
path for viruses to spread. Before LAN was available, viruses travel via floppy 
diskettes when a user saved his or her files on the diskette and passed it to 
somebody else. But when users shared files via LAN servers, an infected file 
stored on the server could be accessed by many users simultaneously and thus 
infect all their computers.  
In the period between 1993 and 1994, commercialization caused the Internet 
to develop rapidly and grow explosively. Once again, new technology enabled 
users to explore new ways of information-sharing. Email, FTP (file transferring 
protocol), and WWW (world wide web) quickly became the most prevalent 
applications on the Internet (Moschovitis et al 1999). People downloaded files from 
web sites and utilized FTP sites to obtain and send files as they did with servers in 
the era of LAN. They also attached files to emails and sent to their family, friends, 
colleagues, and business associates. This again created a new means for viruses 
to spread. However, viruses did not spread via the Internet in this period of time. 
Rather, the major Internet virus outbreaks happed in Stage 2 (1995 – 2000) we 
specified in this study. We will elaborate upon this later.  
Overall, in the period between 1988 and 1994, technologies drove the 
coevolution. First, technological advances, including new programming languages 
and new platforms such as Windows for PCs, enabled hackers to exploit new 
techniques to write viruses. Meanwhile, LAN and Internet technologies also 
allowed users to share information via networks, thus creating new means for virus 
infections. Figure 1 illustrates how technologies drove the coevolution in Stage 1 
(1988 – 1994). 
 
 
 
Technologies Hackers 
Users 
(1a) 
(1b) (1b) 
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(1a) Technological advances enabled hackers to exploit new techniques to write viruses. 
(1b) LAN technologies changed users’ information sharing behavior to replace floppy diskettes with 
networks to share information, and thus created a new means for viruses to spread (via networks).  
 
Figure 1. Technologies drove the coevolution in Stage 1 (1988 – 1994) 
 
5.1.2. Trend Micro’s guided coevolution of new offerings with technologies 
and other populations (1988 – 1994) 
Trend Micro’s executive recognized the influence of new technologies and the 
coevolution process, and consequently developed different antivirus software 
programs so that different platforms could coevolve.  As new programming 
languages and new PC platforms developed, Trend Micro’s engineers developed 
software products accordingly. The company’s PC-based antivirus software “PC-
cillin” was first developed on MS-DOS, and later “ported” (transferred to a new 
platform by using new programming techniques) to the Windows platforms.  
As LAN technologies developed and prevailed, Trend Micro’s executives 
realized that servers could turn into “virus exchange centers” and consequently 
alerted users of the dangers. At that time, however, no protection mechanisms 
were available on the servers. The company’s engineering team began to develop 
the first antivirus software in the world, running on Novell NetWare Servers. The 
prototype was completed in 1991 and named “LANProtect.” It was later changed to 
“LANDesk VirusProtect” when the program was licensed to Intel. The product was 
launched in 1992 as part of Intel’s network management software, LANDesk 
Management Suite, and distributed in the market until 1998. Trend Micro Inc. 
ended the OEM relationship with Intel in 1998 and launched its own version of 
server-based antivirus software, ServerProtect. The product was further developed 
to run on Microsoft Windows NT Server when Novel NetWare gave way to 
Windows NT.  
The server-based antivirus software was a breakthrough in the antivirus 
industry. At first there was no competition in the market, but similar products 
proliferated quickly. Since 1993, there have been seven vendors offering LAN 
server-based antivirus software in the market (Mark 1993). Server-based antivirus 
software gradually gained popularity among users. In 1997, five years after the 
initial launch, the server-based antivirus adoption rate has reached 54% (ICSA 
2005). Server-based antivirus software later became de facto in antivirus software 
product mixes. Today, virtually all antivirus software vendors produce and market 
similar products. In 2003, the server antivirus market reached $222 million, led by 
Trend Micro with a 26.3% market share (Burke 2004). The server-based antivirus 
adoption rate in 2004 reached 95% (ICSA 2005). These statistics reveal the 
profound influences of Trend Micro’s early innovations on the antivirus industry as 
KINERJA Volume 24, No. 1, 2020 Page. 21-40 
28 
 
a whole. Virus protection was no longer merely an issue on desktop PCs; users 
ultimately perceived it as a network security issue.  
As Internet developed and commercialized rapidly, Trend Micro again saw the 
behavioral changes of users. It foresaw the possibilities that viruses might travel 
through email attachments and file downloads on the Internet, and thus spread to 
organizations’ internal networks. Hence, it started to develop antivirus software at 
the Internet gateway, where the internal network of an organization is separated 
from external networks (i.e. the Internet). The product, InterScan VirusWall, was 
launched in 1995. In the following section, we will provide more details of the 
product launch and its consequences.  
5.2. Stage 2 (1995 – 2000) 
5.2.1. Users drove the coevolution in Stage 2 (1995 – 2000) 
Coevolution in this period of time was primarily driven by users. Adoptions and 
development of corporate networks skyrocketed. Numerous organizations built up 
networks to connect their remote offices with their headquarters. As the Internet 
retained its astonishing penetration rate in this period of time, users soon relied 
heavily on email to share information and conduct business.  
The surge of users’ reliance on email encouraged major software vendors such 
as Lotus (later a division of IBM) and Microsoft to develop their proprietary software 
of email systems, which soon gained popularity among corporations. A significant 
number of corporations adopted Lotus Notes Server or Microsoft Exchange Server 
as their email systems, either connected to the Internet or for internal 
communications only. Lotus and Microsoft further expanded functionalities of Notes 
and Exchange, respectively, to facilitate collaboration among users in the same 
organization. They repositioned their products to “groupware”, which is software 
designed to help people involving in a common task. This new type of software 
further attracted more users. Lotus Notes accumulated 17 million installations from 
1989 to 1998, while Microsoft Exchange gained 9.5 million from 1996 to 1998 
(Lyons 1998). 
Adoptions of groupware enhanced communications and collaboration among 
users (Brennan and Rubenstein 1995). Email soon replaced floppy diskettes as a 
main medium for file exchange. However, the prevalence of email also motivated 
hackers to explore new ways of virus composition and distribution. As stated 
earlier, hackers intended to cause havoc, so they kept exploiting the most popular 
means of information-sharing to write and spread viruses. In the mid- 1990s, lots of 
users used Microsoft Word to create documents and share with each other via 
email attachment, so Microsoft Word and email became the most prominent 
targets for viruses.  
The 1996 advent of “Concept”, the first Word Macro virus (composed with 
Microsoft Word Macro commands) signals a paradigm shift in computer viruses. It 
resided in Microsoft Word documents, not in executable program files as traditional 
viruses did. When a contaminated copy of a Word file was opened, the virus 
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infected new Word files created afterward. Soon the new virus spread, and new 
Word Micro viruses with similar infecting schemes proliferated. Exacerbated by 
intensive use of email to exchange Word files, Word Macro viruses propagated 
exponentially, and quickly became the most prevalent species in 1996 and 1997 
(ICSA 1997). 
Users’ increasing adoption of email, together with prevalence of the Word 
Macro viruses, rapidly changed the landscape of virus infection methods. The 
radical change reached its apex in 1999 when “Melissa”, the first email-borne virus, 
broke out. The Melissa virus hit corporate sites on March 26, 1999 (later known as 
the M-day). This Word macro virus had the unusual characteristic (at the time) of 
attaching itself in the email to spread. Whenever a victim opened the infected Word 
document in his/her email, the virus immediately invoked composition of a new 
email, attaching itself in that email and then being forwarded to people listed in the 
victim’s address book. Soon the Melissa virus swept throughout corporate 
networks, leading to a catastrophe. According to the estimation of ICSA (1999), 
482,869 PCs were exposed to the risk of Melissa within a week after the outbreak, 
and the average infection rate for each Melissa incident reached approximately 76 
per 1,000 PCs (ICSA 1999). In addition, Melissa was found to be “more than 38 
times more frequent as the cause of virus disasters in the 30 companies who 
experienced virus disasters after M-day” (ICSA 1999).  
The outbreak of the Melissa virus signified the arrival of the era of email-borne 
viruses. In 1999, email attachments replaced floppy diskettes as the most 
important means of infections. In the subsequent years, similar viruses such as 
“ILOVEYOU” and “AnnaKournikova” broke out time and again, causing 
tremendous losses for users. Table 1 shows the statistics on sources of virus 
infections from 1996 to 2000. We can easily observe that, from 1996 to 2000, 
viruses spreading via email surged, while floppy diskettes gradually disappeared 
from the list of major means of virus infection.  
Table 1. Sources of virus infections, 1996-2000 
Virus source 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Email 
Attachments 
9% 26% 32% 56% 87% 
Diskettes 71% 84% 64% 27% 7% 
Source: ICSA Labs Virus Prevalence Survey 2004 
As users increasingly relied on email and networks for daily operations, the 
growing complexity and scattered pieces of software on the networks made it very 
difficult to manage and update antivirus software so it could catch the latest 
viruses. This called for a centralized management scheme. For computer network 
managers in an organization, keeping track of all the antivirus software scattered 
throughout the network constituted a chronic headache, especially when an 
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organization had branches located in multiple geographical regions. The need for a 
centralized management of antivirus software on the network soon became crucial.  
To summarize, in the period between 1996 and 2000, users drove the 
coevolution. First, users’ adoptions of networks and email encouraged software 
firms to develop new related software, such as Lotus Notes and Microsoft 
Exchange. This in turn facilitates users’ reliance on email to share information. In 
addition, complexity of networks increased dramatically in this period, and thus 
created the need for centralized management of antivirus software on a network. 
Meanwhile, users’ heavy reliance on email motivated hackers to write viruses that 
can wreak spreading havoc via email and networks. 
Figure 2 illustrates how users drove the coevolution in the period from 1995 to 
2000. Note that some of the influences of users on technologies are bi-directional. 
In this stage, users’ adoptions of email and networks stimulated developments of 
related software, such as Lotus Notes and Microsoft Exchange. The new email 
software, in turn, attracted even more users to rely on email to communicate. The 
phenomenon of circular causality is observed in the mutual influences between 
users and technologies.  
 
 
 
 
 
(2a) Users’ adoptions of email and networks spurred development of more email and groupware 
software, such as Lotus Notes and Microsoft Exchange, which in turn facilitates users’ reliance on 
email and groupware software. Complexity of network increased dramatically and thus created 
users’ needs for centralized management for antivirus software. 
(2b) Users’ reliance on email motivated hackers to write viruses to spread via email and networks to 
cause havoc. 
 
Figure 2. Users drove the coevolution in Stage 2 (1995 – 2000) 
5.2.2. Trend Micro’s guided coevolution of new offerings with users and 
other populations (1995 – 2000) 
During this period of time, Trend Micro endeavored to guide its new product 
offerings to coevolve with the user-driven coevolution. In response to the 
increasing use of the Internet and email to share information, Trend Micro’s 
product team started the development of its Internet gateway antivirus software in 
1994. The product, InterScan VirusWall, was finally born in 1995, and became the 
first Internet gateway antivirus software in the world. Similar products were shipped 
Technologies Hackers 
Users 
(2a) (2b) 
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by two major competitors, McAfee and Symantec, until June 1996 (Vance 1996) 
and February 1997, respectively.  
The LAN server antivirus took five years to reach a penetration rate of 54%. 
Internet gateway antivirus programs gained users’ acceptance at an even faster 
pace. In 1999, four years after Trend Micro’s InterScan VirusWall was launched, 
adoption rate of Internet email gateway antivirus software reached 53% (ICSA 
2005). The VirusWall was eventually patented and further facilitated the company’s 
fast growth. Statistics showed that the adoption rate of Internet email gateway 
antivirus programs amounted to 80% in 2000 and 84% in 2001 respectively (ICSA 
2005). With the first-mover advantage, Trend Micro led this market segment for 
several years. This segment grew to US$ 338 million in 2003, with a 35.7% market 
share taken by Trend Micro (Burke 2004). Gateway based antivirus systems later 
became ubiquitous—96% of organizations by 2004 had adopted antivirus 
protections for their email gateways (ICSA 2005).  
In addition, Trend Micro also started to develop virus scanning products for 
proprietary email systems. The software is meant to stop the viruses before they 
get delivered to numerous end users, much like checking for anthrax in mail at post 
offices. These two products were launched in 1996 and 1997 respectively, but 
demand remained weak because of a general lack of awareness of potential 
damages caused by email viruses. Trend Micro’s product team developed the 
email-based antivirus software mainly because it did have an awareness, as per 
interviews with Trend Micro managers. 
But in 1999, when the first email-borne virus “Melissa” broke out, the two 
products proved their worth. During the outbreaks, the software successfully 
blocked tons of copies of the Melissa virus on email servers, inhibiting it from 
spreading to email recipients. Consequently, Trend Micro’s competitors announced 
similar products after the company launched its ScanMail products. Email-based 
antivirus software developed by these firms together later created a new market 
segment in the antivirus industry, with Trend Micro leading the segment worth a 
total of US$ 328 million in 2003 by a 20.1% market share (Burke 2004).  
Innovations in email-based antivirus software also changed users’ perceptions 
and behaviors regarding antivirus programs. An increasing number of users started 
to regularly scan email traffic in real time for viruses, and certain file attachments 
were blocked, filtered, or quarantined on the email servers to reduce chance of 
infection. Within a few years, virtually all users who have adopted email antivirus 
software have set certain email policies. Statistics shows that, in 2004, 99% of 
these users scan their email traffic in real time, 93% of them block, filter, or 
quarantine email attachment by file types, and 70% of them scan message folders 
or databases (ICSA 2005).  
Trend Micro once again guided its product offerings to coevolve with users. 
The company’s product team utilized the burgeoning field of web-based 
programming technologies and systems technologies to create the “Trend Micro 
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Control Manager”, a software tool that centrally controls and manages all the 
antivirus software on an organization’s network. The company even changed its 
corporate slogan to “central control is the only virus control” for a certain period of 
time.  
The product was initially launched 1998, the same year the company filed its 
IPO. This management utility solved many corporate IT headaches regarding 
antivirus software. Such a utility has later become the de facto standard in antivirus 
software, with most antivirus software companies offering similar tools.  
5.3. Stage 3 (2001 – 2005) 
5.3.1. Hackers drove the coevolution in Stage 3 (2001 – 2005) 
In this period of time, hackers gradually took their turn to drive the coevolution. 
Since the first email-borne virus “Melissa” burst onto the scene in 1999, viruses 
became ever more complicated, with lots of new types created using different 
techniques. The peak arrived in 2001 when the hybrid types of viruses broke out. 
Why did such an upheaval take place? We attribute it to changes in hackers’ 
community.  
Two prominent trends were observed in hackers’ community: integrated 
security breaches and change in hackers’ motives and intentions. First, various 
hacking techniques started to converge in this period, mainly due to an abundance 
of hacking resources on the Internet. Traditionally, hackers were either 
programming experts or savvy systems engineers who possessed high proficiency 
in computer engineering. However, as networking technologies matured, hackers 
exploited them by posting tools and guidebooks on the Internet to share with each 
other. Any ill-intended computer amateur could easily download these tools and 
become hackers (Boulanger 1998). The wide availability of these resources 
enabled all the “bad guys”—such as vandals, crackers, spammers (people who 
distribute unsolicited email), and virus writers—to adopt each other’s techniques to 
perpetrate. Key examples included the high-profile DDoS (distributed denial-of-
service) attacks targeting famous web sites like Yahoo, CNN, and Amazon, and 
assaults aimed at the White House web site during the outbreak of the Code Red 
worm in 2001. Hackers used tools such as Code Red, Trinoo, TFN2K, or Shaft to 
plant malicious codes on innocent computers (called “zombies”) on the Internet, 
and took advantage of the zombies to launch attacks.  This was a brand new 
technique, because previous security breaches had never involved such 
sophisticated tools and schemes.  
Second, motives and intentions of hackers changed in this period. In the past, 
viruses and other malicious codes were typically composed for fun, or to create 
chaos to seek notoriety. However, in more recent years, hackers have been 
increasingly motivated by financial gains.  They use malware to commit organized 
crimes such as obtaining credit card numbers, stealing bank account information, 
exploiting other personal information, or threatening to publish the victim's data or 
perpetually block access to it unless a ransom is paid. As a consequence, online 
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frauds and identity thefts proliferated after 2001, with increasing sophistication and 
scale (Burke 2004).  
The new wave of hybrid types of computer viruses such as Nimda and Code 
Red finally blasted through the Internet in 2001, presenting an unprecedented 
challenge for IT staff in organizations (ICSA 2002). These were not totally new 
types of viruses. Instead, they were a hybrid of several existing techniques, 
including viruses, worms, and hackers’ tools. Email attachments were no longer 
the only media by which they spread; they acted like hackers, spread like spam 
(unsolicited commercial email), and destroyed data on computer systems in 
organizations. They exploited flaws in Microsoft and other firm’s software to 
compromise targeted machines. To a certain extent, the hybrid malware obsolete 
existing security solutions, such as antivirus software, firewall systems and 
intrusion detection system, because no single solution could effectively stop the 
new attacks.  
Most users were baffled and frustrated in trying to stop the hybrid digital 
vermin. In subsequent years, the rapidity, frequency and complexity of spreading 
infections continued to increase as organizations relied more and more on the 
Internet for business operations. Network unavailability caused by virus or worm 
attacks became ever more intolerable for organizations. However, since no single 
existing security product could effectively stop the attacks, users could merely 
disconnect the network temporarily whenever a hybrid malware broke out, and wait 
for the storm to end (Richardson 2003). If viruses still sneaked into the internal 
network, nothing could be done except to clean up the remnants and then try to 
restore the computer systems as soon as possible. This usually cost significant 
time and efforts.  
We use Figure 3 below to summarize how hackers drove the coevolution from 
2001 to 2005. Basically, hackers (including vandals, crackers, spammers, and 
virus writers) started to exploit each other’s techniques. Together with changes in 
hackers’ motives and intentions, existing products could no longer protect users 
from attacks, rendering them bewildered and helpless.  
 
 
 
 
 
(3a) Convergence of hacking techniques, along with changes of hackers’ motives and intentions, 
made extant protecting technologies obsolete.  
(3b) Users were baffled, but could not find any effective solutions to stop new hybrid attacks. 
 
Technologies Hackers 
Users 
(3a) 
(3b) 
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Figure 3. Hackers drove the coevolution in Stage 3 (2001 – 2005) 
 
5.3.2. Trend Micro’s guided coevolution of new offerings with hackers and 
other populations (2001 – 2005) 
Perceiving the severity of the new hybrid type of viruses, Trend Micro in 2001 
conducted a comprehensive study. Officials visited over 300 organizations to 
investigate how users handled the hybrid virus problems. They found that 
companies typically dealt with the problem by installing antivirus and other security 
software or hardware, leaving other necessary policies, procedures and services 
unattended. Given the new environment, this approach had limitations, since it 
overlooked the big picture of the entire process. The reality was that security 
exploits were inevitable, because hackers would never stop attacking. The key was 
to design a strategy to mitigate damages caused by attacks, so normal business 
operations could continue without interruptions.  
Based on these findings, Trend Micro designed a service offering named 
“Enterprise Protection Strategy.” Launched in 2002, its aim was to deal with the 
problems from the perspective of threat lifecycle management. The service 
development team decomposed, analyzed, and restructured relevant procedures 
and processes, and designed the new services accordingly to help users handle 
security breaches.  
The service has since evolved through different stages, expanding to cover 
more aspects of the entire process: planning, implementing, protecting, 
responding, recovering, monitoring, and auditing. New “Expert Services” covering a 
wider spectrum of security management was later developed and launched at the 
end of 2005.  
5.4. Summary of Trend Micro’s guided coevolution 
The above analyses revealed how varying patterns of guided coevolution 
influenced new offerings due to hackers, users, and technologies in different time 
periods. A time line of Trend Micro’s guided coevolution is provided in Table 2. 
Note that some of the effects of coevolution in the earlier stage were not obvious 
until the next stage. For example, the effects of technological advances in networks 
upon the first stage were not evident until users’ increasing reliance on email was 
observed in the second stage. This “legging” phenomenon corresponds to 
researchers’ calling for an analysis of historical data when conducting coevolution 
studies (Lewin and Volberda 1999). Without such analysis, we can never 
understand the coevolution process accurately.   
 
 
 
Innovation as Guided Coevolution: The Trend Micro Case (1998 – 2005) 
(Anthony Kuo, Shih-tse Lo, Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, and Ivy Chiu) 
35 
 
 
Table 2. Time line of Trend Micro’s guided coevolution 
 Technologies Hackers Users Trend Micro’s 
new offerings 
 
Competitions 
Stage 1 
 
(1988–
1994) 
 MS-DOS , 
Windows, new 
programming 
languages, 
Local Area 
Network (LAN) 
developed and 
prevailed.  
 Novell 
NetWare 
dominated in 
the LAN 
operating 
systems. 
 Internet 
developed and 
started to 
commercialize 
rapidly. 
 Hackers 
adopted new 
technologies to 
write viruses to 
infect new 
platforms as 
Windows and 
LAN prevailed. 
 Viruses began 
to spread vastly 
through 
Windows and 
LAN 
respectively.   
 Users switched 
from MS-DOS 
to Windows 
platform.  
 As LAN 
prevailed, users 
relied more and 
more on LAN, 
abandoning 
floppy diskettes, 
to share 
information.  
 Users started to 
adopt the 
Internet, 
especially via 
email, to share 
information. 
 “PC-cillin” (PC 
antivirus 
software) for 
MS-DOS and 
for Windows 
platforms were 
launched as 
new platforms 
were brought to 
the world.  
 “LANDesk 
VirusProtect” 
(LAN based 
antivirus 
software) was 
launched in 
1992. 
 At first no rivalry 
existed in the 
market, but 
competition 
intensified very 
fast as 
competitors 
launched similar 
products. 
 Trend Micro has 
maintained its 
leading status in 
the LAN 
antivirus market 
segment. 
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 Technologies Hackers Users Trend Micro’s 
new offerings 
 
Competitions 
Stage 2  
 
(1995–
2000) 
 Commercial use 
of the Internet 
grew swiftly. 
 Corporate 
networks 
developed. 
 Major software 
firms such as 
Microsoft and 
Lotus 
developed their 
software of 
email systems. 
 Web-based 
programming 
and systems 
technologies 
developed and 
were getting 
mature. 
 Users’ reliance 
on the Internet 
and email 
motivated 
hackers to 
exploit Internet 
to spread 
viruses. 
 The first Macro 
virus, 
“Concept”, 
which infects 
Microsoft Word 
documents, was 
born in 1996, 
and Macro 
viruses soon 
began to spread 
vastly through 
the Internet.  
 The first email-
blasting virus, 
“Melissa”, broke 
out in 1999, and 
email soon 
became the 
most prevalent 
means of virus 
infections. 
 Users heavily 
relied on email 
to share 
information 
and conduct 
business.  
 Networks 
became inter-
connected, 
and were thus 
getting very 
complex.  
 Users had 
difficulties to 
manage and 
update their 
antivirus 
software 
scattered on 
the network. 
Consequently, 
email viruses 
spread via the 
Internet 
explosively. 
 “InterScan 
VirusWall” (an 
Internet 
gateway 
antivirus 
software) was 
launched in 
1995. 
 “ScanMail” for 
Microsoft 
Exchange and 
Lotus Notes 
email and 
groupware 
antivirus 
software) was 
launched in 
1996 and 1997 
respectively. 
 “Trend Virus 
Control System” 
(a centralized 
management 
utility for 
antivirus 
software) was 
launched in 
1998.  
 At first no rivalry 
existed in the 
market; 
competitors 
launched similar 
products soon 
after Trend 
Micro launched 
its innovative 
new software 
products.  
 As the first-
mover in 
network-based 
antivirus 
software, Trend 
Micro kept 
leading this 
market 
segment. 
Stage 3 
 
(2001–
2005) 
 The hybrid 
types of 
viruses/worms 
obsolete 
existing security 
solutions, such 
as antivirus, 
firewall, and 
intrusion 
detections. 
None of these 
solutions alone 
could effectively 
stop the new 
hybrid attacks.  
 Convergence 
of hacking 
techniques 
took place.  
 Hackers 
changed their 
motives and 
intentions. 
 The new wave 
of hybrid types 
of computer 
viruses such 
as Nimda and 
Code Red 
blasted 
through the 
Internet in 
2001. 
 Users were 
baffled when 
dealing with the 
new hybrid 
types of viruses. 
No effective 
solutions could 
be found to stop 
the new types 
of viruses.  
 Trend Micro 
launched 
“Enterprise 
Protection 
Strategy” (an 
integrated 
threat lifecycle 
management 
service offering) 
in 2001. 
 Expert Services 
covering a 
wider scope 
was launched in 
the end of 2005. 
 Competitors 
adopted 
different 
approaches to 
evolve.  
 More 
competition 
came from 
convergence of 
closely related 
species in the 
security 
industry. 
 
Remarks: Shaded cells with bold fonts represent the driving force in the coevolution process.  
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6. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Several aspects of the findings in our case study may not be directly related to 
the theme of guided coevolution. However, they are worthy of more detailed 
discussions. We elaborate the details in the next section. 
6.1. Identifying the driving force early may bring first-mover advantages 
Trend Micro’s experience provides a good managerial reference for high-tech 
firms regarding first-mover advantage. Our case study indicates that the company 
has maintained its leading position, for certain periods of time, in the market 
segments shaped by its innovations. As the research has revealed, it identified the 
driving forces early on in different stages of the coevolution process.  After 
recognizing the driving force, the company proceeded to develop corresponding 
products or services, creating new market segments and raising entry barriers. 
Even though its competitors subsequently launched similar products, the company 
could still lead the market segment for a certain period of time and enjoyed the 
first-mover advantage.  
6.2. Observing the social process of technological change to identify the 
driving force 
Both technologies and relevant human actors, such as users and hackers, can 
drive the coevolution process. In our case study, technologies drove the 
coevolution in the first stage (1988–1994), as per the “technology-economic 
paradigm.” But changes in human perceptions and behaviors sparked new 
opportunities for the case company to innovate in the second (1995–2000) and 
third stages (2001–2005). If users had never adopted network technologies and 
consequently changed their behavior to share information, or hackers had not kept 
exploiting new technologies to wreak havoc, viruses would still have been a PC 
security issue, and the information security industry landscape would be totally 
different. Therefore, it is critical for high-tech firm to pay additional attention to the 
behavior of human actors, along with technology development.  
6.3. Limitations and future research suggestions 
This study brings insights, but also has limitations. For example, we have only 
explored the role of two human actors—users and hackers—in the process of 
coevolution. The conceptual model drawn from the results is only applicable in the 
context of human-technology interaction, and the contribution of this study is 
therefore limited to the related context. More factors such as social, economic, 
institutional, cultural factors, etc. are also worth noting. We would like to call for 
more research to fill the gap.  
We would like to propose some starting points. For scholars, the research by 
Dijksterhuis et al. (1999) may be a good reference on how to identify the source of 
coevolution when conducting academic research. In their paper, the authors 
explain how they identified the source of coevolution in new organizational forms. 
Although they intended to elaborate on how to design an organization to align with 
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its external environment, we believe their rationale will also help with identifying the 
sources of coevolution.  
As for practitioners, we recommend the book Heads Up: How to Anticipate 
Business Surprises and Seize Opportunities First (McGee 2004). McGee illustrated 
how to identify and monitor relevant data and information to “predict the present” 
and thus detect signs of changes early on to seize opportunities. We believe the 
practices advocated by the author are adequate and relevant in recognizing the 
driving forces of coevolution.  
Our case study explains how in a turbulent high-tech industry, a software 
company pursued innovation by guiding its offerings to coevolve with new 
technologies and perceptional/behavioral changes in human actors.  Successful 
innovation involves not only technologies but also human factors. Due to the 
exploratory nature of this study, our contributions are limited, as stated above. 
Nonetheless, we hope this study will inspire future research. 
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